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INTRODUCTION
Along with the Negro's changing image of himself has come an
awakening moral consciousness on the part of millions of white
Americans concerning segregation.'
Life is a struggle. In nature, for instance, many creatures must
struggle to see their first ray of sunlight. There is a most elegant struggle
as the caterpillar fights to emerge from the cocoon transformed into a
butterfly. Many birds mark the end of gestation and the beginning of avian
ability with a remarkable struggle from within the egg. New shoots break
free from the earth from a recently planted seed.
In religion, as another example, great significance is associated with
the meaning of a struggle. The concept of "jihad," or holy war, is
1. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 468 (James M. Washington ed., 1986) (emphasis added).
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important to Islam.2 In Christianity, struggle is also an essential part of
daily life.3 In addition, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the story of Jacob
provides an example of struggle, where Jacob wrestled with an angel and
refused to let go until blessed with a new spiritual identity.4
So should it be with citizens in the democratic political process-it is
essential that the people themselves create the culture, imagine the
environment, and reach consensus in the communities in which they live.
Indeed, this is the heritage of the American Nation. The Nation was born
out of a spirit of struggle and the framers realized that it was better to be
governed by the collective standards of the people, as they know best how
to meet their own needs.' Furthermore, we have retained these ideas in the
fabric of our collective culture. The "American Dream," to which many
citizens aspire, is essentially a manifestation of this spirit of struggle in
everyday life.6 Success is never so sweet if it simply comes from a gift.'
2. See, e.g., THE HOLY QUR'AN WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION 4:95 (6th ed. 2000) ("Those
of the believers who sit ... other than those who have a (disabling) hurt, are not on equal with
those who strive for the cause of Allah with their wealth and their lives. Allah has conferred on
those who strive with their wealth and lives a rank above the ones who sit (at home)"); id. at
2:218 ("Assuredly, those who believe and emigrate (to escape persecution because of their
religion) and fight in the way of Allah, may hope for Allah's mercy. Allah is Forgiving,
Merciful."); id. at 3:142 ("Did you suppose that you would enter the Garden before Allah had
tested (known) those of you who really strived (for His cause), and who endured with
steadfastness?"). See generally MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 118-
46 (1997) (describing the importance of Jihad in Islam and the different forms thereof).
3. See James 2:14-26 (New International) (explaining that "a person is justified by what he
does and not by faith alone" and that "faith by itself, if it is not accompanied by action, is dead.");
Luke 9:23 (New International) ("If anyone would come after me, he must deny himself and take
up his cross daily and follow me.") (emphasis added); Luke 14:27 (New International) (quoting
Jesus that "anyone who does not carry his cross and follow me cannot be my disciple"); Mark
8:34 (New International); Matthew 10:38 (New International) (quoting Jesus that "anyone who
does not take his cross and follow me is not worthy of me"); Matthew 16:24 (New International)
(quoting Jesus that "[ilf anyone would come after me, he must deny himself and take up his cross
and follow me."); I Timothy 6:12 (New International) ("Fight the good fight of the faith. Take
hold of the eternal life to which you were called ... ").
4. See Genesis 32:22-31 (New International) (quoting God's blessing to Jacob that "[y]our
name will no longer be Jacob, but Israel, because you have struggled with God and with men and
have overcome.") (emphasis added). Even more fundamentally, a translation of "Israel" is "he
struggles with God." THE HOLY BIBLE (New International Version 32) (Ultra Thin Ref. Ed.
1999).
5. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
6. One example of the importance of participation in American life is the significance of
negotiation and collective bargaining in the modem workforce. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 150-160 (2000)
(creating the National Labor Relations Board and providing employees with the right to organize
and bargain collectively). See also Marion Crain, Building Solidarity Through Expansion of
NLRA Coverage: A Blueprint for Worker Empowerment, 74 MINN. L. REV. 953, 958 (1990)
("The NLRA purported to establish a system of industrial democracy that would, through the
vehicles of worker collective organization and bargaining, offer workers the opportunity to
empower themselves.").
Also consider that English notions of respect for the use of labor in making property
one's own still exist in the public mind. See Sandra B. Zellmer and Scott A. Johnson,
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Rather, Americans derive a true sense of satisfaction and personal worth
when they harvest the fruits of their own labor-having contributed
individually and collectively to a goal deemed worthy by the person
individually or society collectively.
Americans are called, in the present day, to a refinement of this spirit
of struggle. Since struggle, by definition, includes even "violent efforts,"8
struggle must take on a new meaning within the framework of the modern
American democracy.9 Surely humans strive to live in a world that is more
Biodiversity in and Around McElligot's Pool, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 490 n.87 (2002) (stating
that farmers who own lands potentially subject to regulation have been influenced by the labor
theory of wealth as articulated by John Locke and noted by Sir William Blackstone).
7. Several forms of wealth transfer have been disfavored in the American democracy, in
contrast from the British practices. For example, Thomas Jefferson initiated the abolishment of
fee tail, an estate that could only be inherited by specified descendants of the decedent, and
primogeniture, the right of the firstborn male son to exclusively inherit an ancestor's estate, in
Virginia during the Revolutionary War era. See JESSE DUKEMINIER AND JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 218 (5th ed. 2002); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 630, 1210 (7th ed. 1999). Currently,
the fee tail is rarely encountered in the few states that allow it. Spendthrift trusts, which restrict
the beneficiary from assigning his interests, have been described as the "ideological descendant"
of the fee tail. See JESSE DUKEMINIER AND STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 631-32 (6th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON]; BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1518 (7th ed. 1999). Professor John Chipman Gray, for example, was "outraged" at
the introduction of spendthrift trusts and stated that they would "form a privileged class." See
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON at 631-32. Besides disfavoring attempts to concentrate real property
within the family, there have also been concerns about other large wealth transfers. See James R.
Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 827 (2001) (explaining that
public discontent with estate taxes and the movement to repeal them is relatively recent, and
concluding that "[w]ealth concentration also harms the democratic process because it gives too
much power to the affluent.").
8. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1238 (1 th ed. 2003) (defining the
verb "struggle" as "to make strenuous or violent efforts in the face of difficulties or opposition")
(emphasis added).
9. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (giving the Legislative branch the power of
"calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions"). For legislation enacted pursuant to this grant of power, see 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (2000),
providing that:
Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against
the authority of the United States ... or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both ... and shall
be incapable of holding any office under the United States.
The President is authorized to respond to any internal insurrections. See 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000)
(providing that "[w]henever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the
President may ... call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number
requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress
the insurrection.").
Recall, also, that the Civil War is an example of the squelching of such an internal
insurrection. See, e.g., White v. Hart, 80 U.S. 646, 650 (1875) (remarking that "[t]he doctrine of
secession is a doctrine of treason, and practical secession is practical treason, seeking to give
itself triumph by revolutionary violence. The late rebellion was without any element of right or
sanction of law. The duration and magnitude of the war did not change its character.");
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orderly than the "state of nature,""0 thereby mitigating some of the harsh
circumstances previously described of the natural world. The essence of
what is required of a citizen, then, is not an unconstrained instinct to
struggle that would be more appropriate for the "state of nature," but rather
the will to put forth the necessary effort to become "community
creatures."" Modem American citizens must put forth the effort to know
others and to be known by them. In other words, American citizens must
discover a personal and moral identity for themselves, while respecting and
acknowledging the rights and choices of others who do the same; they must
search and examine their own prejudices,12 while having patience for others
as they try to extinguish their own stereotypes. This requires an equal,
Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 714-15 (1871) (adjudicating a dispute arising out of the Civil
War and stating that the power to declare war and suppress insurrection "carries with it inherently
rightful authority to guard against an immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils
growing out of its rise and progress.").
Analogously, the states also have inherent power to quell rebellions against the state.
See White, 80 U.S. at 650-51 (1871). See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (providing that the
federal government shall protect the states against "domestic [v]iolence.").
It should not come as a surprise that the framers intended the political process to be
inclusive enough that grievances would be worked out without subsequent violent revolutions.
They were, after all, seeking to establish a participatory government and attempting to control the
"violence of faction." See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (Henry B. Dawson
ed., 1865) ("Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of
faction."). See also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting. .. the right
of the people peaceably to assemble") (emphasis added). See also Bruce A. Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1020 (1984) (commending
The Federalist for suggesting the "public-regarding forms of politics" as a solution to
revolutionary legitimacy).
10. See THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 74-79 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publishing
Company, 1994).
11. M. Scott Peck, M.D., provides a definition and discussion of '"community creatures," as
opposed to merely "social animals." See M. SCOTT PECK, MEDITATIONS FROM THE ROAD 239
(1993).
The ultimate goal is to remove the resolution of significant social and political issues
from the committee room at the legislative building to the living room at the neighbor's house.
An important intermediate step, however, is interaction at a civic level. See generally ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000)
(detailing a decline in American social and civic participation) [hereinafter PUTNAM]; ROBERT D.
PUTNAM & LEWIS M. FELDSTEIN, BETtER TOGETHER: RESTORING THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY
(2003) (describing efforts to create social capital) [hereinafter PUTNAM & FELDSTEIN].
In fact, according to President Washington, the very Constitution itself was "the result of
a spirit of amity." Letter of George Washington, President of the Federal Convention, to the
President of Congress, Transmitting the Constitution (Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted in DANIEL M.
FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. 2, at 20 (3d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter FARBER].
12. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
162-64 (1980) (suggesting that sufficient social interaction can, under some circumstances, help
to remove stereotypes). But see Mandara Meyers, (Un)equal Protection for the Poor:
Exclusionary Zoning and the Need for Stricter Scrutiny, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 349, 349-51 (2003)
(highlighting negative characteristics of modem communities).
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perhaps even greater, quantum of "effort" as those in the natural world.
Somehow, however, Americans have wandered astray from this
community-centered basis of social reform.13 In the relatively recent past,
courts have become increasingly involved in social movements. 4 To some
that agree with the judiciary's position in any particular case, the courts are
to be praised for helping the country come to the "right"' 5 result.
Such praises should be reexamined. First, strictly legally speaking, in
a society such as ours, 6 the concept of objective "right" is extraordinarily
elusive. Americans are quite unwilling to substitute others' moral and
social judgments for their own.'7 The only "right" society can rely upon,
then, is the "right" agreed upon by the majority of society. 8 Second, even
13. Archibald Cox states:
Constitutionalism works, our liberties are protected, and our society is free because
officials, individuals, and the people as a whole realize that liberty for the weak depends
upon the rule of law and the rule of law depends upon voluntary compliance. When the
test comes, that realization must be strong enough for the people to rise up, morally and
politically, and overwhelm the offender. The roots of constitutionalism lie in the hearts
of the people.
ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 15 (1987) (emphasis added). See
generally PUTNAM, supra note 11 (analyzing the decrease in American civil participation).
14. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a law against
homosexual sodomy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a law against abortion);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a law against the use of
contraceptives by married couples); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down
segregation in the public schools); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down
laws intended to curtail the use of child labor); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(striking down a law regulating the number of hours employees could work).
Thus, De Tocqueville has proved to be somewhat of a soothsayer. See ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 93-98 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds.,
2000) (1835) ("There are in fact very few laws of a nature to escape judicial analysis for long, for
there are very few that do not hurt an individual interest and that litigants cannot or will not
invoke before the courts.").
15. The word "right" is only used in its sense whereby it means "correct." By the use of the
word "right," the author does not intend to imply that this article endorses either a "conservative"
or "liberal" approach to constitutional law. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1073 (11 th. ed. 2003) (defining the word "right" as "conforming to facts or truth:
Correct"). This Comment was not conceived under a framework of, or intended to advance,
either ideology.
16. This would not be true in a form of government where an individual or a group is vested
with the power to define an objective "right." For example, in a monarchy, the monarch is
believed to be divine. The American government, of course, is not such a system.
17. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1 (providing that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."). Cf THE
FEDERALIST NO. 50, at 360 (James Madison) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1865) ("If men were angels,
no [g]overnment would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on [g]overnment would be necessary.").
18. See, e.g., Sir Patrick Devlin, Lecture, Legal Moralism Defended, in LEGAL PHILOSOPHY:
SELECTED READINGS 277 (Timothy C. Schiell, ed., 1993) ("If men and women try to create a
society in which there is no fundamental agreement about good and evil they will fail; if, having
2004]
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if a court's preference is "right," as determined on some scale of absolute
morality, 9 to assume that the courts can actually cause social change may
be premature.2° Courts should consider the possibility that, by "helping"
Americans reach the "right" result, they actually rob them of the culture
and knowledge of organizing and mobilizing to effect social changes and
the subsequent self dignity realized as a benefit of this participation-the
natural products of a healthy democratic process.2 ' It is possible, then, that
the judiciary's modem propensity to exercise judicial review to strike the
public's legislative enactments becomes a sort of judicial novocaine,
numbing the consciences and denying the dignity22 of millions of
Americans.
Beginning with a brief description of the Civil Rights Movement in
America to illustrate the power and effectiveness of an inclusive social
movement, this Comment will identify and discuss five adverse
consequences that may accompany judicial invalidation of legislative
enactments. In light of these consequences of the political process and
based it on common agreement, the agreement goes, and the society will disintegrate.") (emphasis
added). Devlin continues to say that, since a society must be based on "common agreement,"
legislation based on morality is permissible. Id.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recently held that "the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). This highlights one troubling
aspect of the effective determination of "right" as a matter of constitutional law. If an advocacy
group convinces the legislature it is "right," and legislation is subsequently enacted, a rival group
must only find "common agreement"-a majority of legislators-to change the law. However,
when a court makes a constitutional judgment on the point, the judicial determination of "right" is
more difficult to overturn. In such a case, a standard is imposed upon the society that is not
founded upon common agreement. While Devlin contends that the "society will disintegrate,"
this Comment will argue that it will at least lead to some adverse consequences for the "winner"
of the litigation, and may even lead to violence. Id.; see infra Part H.
19. Even should one propose to announce such a scale, it would most certainly be subject to
immense controversy by the public. Cf LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) ("For
myself, it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how
to choose them, which I assuredly do not."). But see Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics,
Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1235 (lamenting the trend away from recognizing the laws
of God as a guiding principle for secular government).
20. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (challenging the traditional assumption that courts stimulate
social change).
21. See Julia K. Sullens, Comment, Thus Far and No Further: The Supreme Court Draws
the Outer Boundary of the Right to Privacy, 61 TULANE L. REv. 907, 927 (1987) (explaining that,
in the wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), "[h]omosexual advocates now know
that they must aim their efforts at state legislatures, rather than courts, to repeal sodomy statutes
and other laws which restrict their freedoms because of their sexual preference.").
22. Cf MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR
COMMUNITY?, reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE 610 (James M. Washington ed., Harper
Collins 1991) ("The dignity [African American's] jobs may deny them is waiting for them in
political and social action.").
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everyday living, this Comment will suggest ways the judiciary can support
the American democracy, by examining the institutional character of the
judiciary and reconsidering the importance and the role of the political
process, methods to support access to the political process, and, finally,
methods to tame the doctrine of substantive due process. Upon completion,
the Comment will have underscored the need for courts to be careful to
avoid suppressing the political process in favor of judicial "resolution."
Judicial intervention in social movements may actually deprive Americans
of the culture and knowledge of mobilizing to effect social changes-the
natural products of a healthy democratic process.23
I. HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Before considering the adverse affects of judicial intervention on the
people of the nation, this Comment examines the history of a major social
movement in America-the Second Reconstruction (also called the Civil
Rights Movement).24 Consideration of the role of the courts and the
strategies chosen by both proponents and opponents of the movement
provides a better understanding of what has successfully caused change in
our society, and the results of any such processes.
The Civil Rights Movement, for example, illustrates the importance of
community collaboration in America. An instructive way to frame the
discussion of the movement is to consider what caused the change from
23. It is important to realize what this Comment does not address. This Comment takes no
policy position on what the government should do--only the manner in which results should be
reached. For a similar argument, please see James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73,
73 (1887) (noting analogously that "whether Congress has the power... [and] whether under any
given circumstances it is wise or right that Congress should use it, are very different things.").
24. This Comment limits the discussion of history due to the scope of the article. However,
in focusing on Civil Rights history, the Comment does not intend to overlook or belittle the
experience of other social movements, including the Women's Rights movements, Labor and
Union movement, and Gay Rights movement. For a review of these histories, see generally
MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED (1986) (examining the ERA in the larger context of
the constitutional amendment process); RENEE FEINBERG, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
(1986) (providing a history and background of the Equal Rights Amendment); ROSENBERG,
supra note 20, at 203-27, 341 (concluding that the court's involvement weakened the
organization of women's rights advocacy groups). Treating a social movement as distinct from
others also creates an artificial appearance that the movements are in fact separate. In reality,
however, they are often interconnected. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1994) (affording protections not only on the account of race, but also "color, religion, sex, or
national origin").
25. This Comment takes notice that there are difficulties in comparing social movements.
Some authorities have argued that this practice "obscures and confuses" issues. See, e.g., Serena
Mayeri, A Common Fate of Discrimination: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical
Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1048-51 (2001). However, history is a powerful tool to consult
in attempting to improve upon the past. In addition, acclaimed scholars have compared major
social movements to draw conclusions. See generally, ROSENBERG, supra note 20 (comparing
major social movements).
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1619, when the first African slaves arrived,26 to 2003, when the Supreme
Court approved affirmative action legislation designed to benefit African
Americans." At all critical times, it was that oppressed people and
privileged people of conscience worked together to produce social reform.
During slavery, slaves rebelled, 28 escaped to freedom,29 and worked to
create a network to bring about equality.3" Even people who were not
enslaved, when convicted by their conscience, worked to bring about this
change.31
26. See JOEL WILLIAMSON, A RAGE FOR ORDER: BLACK/WHITE RELATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION iX (1986).
27. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-33 (2003).
28. See generally ROBERT V. HAYNES, BLACKS IN WHITE AMERICA BEFORE 1865: ISSUES
AND INTERPRETATIONS 286-353 (1972) (detailing the movements of African-American
protestors and resistors before 1865). For a specific example, see id. at 288 (including a narrative
of Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a white abolitionist describing a revolt in Charleston).
29. See generally CHARLES L. BLOCKSON, THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (1987)
(collecting narratives of escaped slaves); WILLIAM STILL, THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (1872)
(in the author's own description, "[niarrating the hardships, hair-breadth escapes and death
struggles of the slaves in their efforts for freedom, as related by themselves and others, or
witnessed by the author; together with sketches of some of the largest stockholders, and most
liberal aiders and advisers, of the road").
30. See BLOCKSON, supra note 29, at 4 (noting the role of freed African-American men as
"assiduous organizers of networks to freedom"); id. at 117-23 (describing the efforts of Harriet
Tubman); W.E.B. Dubois, Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the
Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880
(1935), reprinted in HAYNES, supra note 28, at 447-90 (describing the role of African-Americans
in waging the Civil War). See generally FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS (Gramercy Books 1993) (1845) (describing abolitionist efforts).
31. See Robert Robinson, Slavery Inconsistent with the Spirit of Christianity, Sermon
Preached at Cambridge 24-26 (Feb. 10, 1788) microformed on The Eighteenth Century 1-2586
reel 11560 no. 3 (Primary Source Microfilm); Reverand David Rice, Slavery Inconsistent with
Justice and Good Policy, Speech Delivered in the Convention 3, 24 (1792) microformed on The
Eighteenth Century 1-2586 reel 1513 no. 10 (Research Publications); Minutes of the Proceedings
of the Eight Convention of Delegates From the Abolition Societies Established in Different parts
of the United States § 133 (Jan. 10-14, 1803) microformed on serial 1-1030 (KTO Microfilm);
Address of the American Convention for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and Improving the
Condition of the African Race to the People of the United States 4 (Jan. 1804) microformed on
Early American Imprint Microprint 1-3 no. 5698 (Readex Microprint); Minutes of the
Proceedings of the Eleventh American Convention for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and
Improving the Condition of the African Race 5-6 (Jan. 13-14, 1806) microformed on serial 1-
1030 (KTO Microfilm); Minutes of the Adjourned Session of the Twentieth Biennial American
Convention for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and Improving the Condition of the African
Race 18-19 (Nov. 3, 1828) microformed on serial 1-1030 (KTO Microfilm). See generally
HENRIETTA BUCKMASTER, LET MY PEOPLE GO: THE STORY OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD
AND THE GROWTH OF THE ABOLITIONIST MOVEMENT 25-47 (1941) (describing the efforts of
white abolitionists in organizing the underground railroad); WILLIAM E. CAIN, WILLIAM LLOYD
GARRISON AND THE FIGHT AGAINST SLAVERY: SELECTIONS FROM THE LIBERATOR (1995)
(collecting published articles from Garrison's The Liberator and other public remarks advocating
abolition of slavery); RUSSEL B. NYE, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE HUMANITARIAN
REFORMERS (1955) (describing the efforts of William Lloyd Garrison and other white
abolitionists).
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Thus, following the Civil War,3 2 African Americans were permitted to
vote and actually held a number of public offices.33 Unfortunately, this
trend did not continue. "After the Civil War ended, white southern
politicians and government officials went to work subverting and reducing
the position of blacks in the American South."' At the same time, southern
legislatures passed "Black Codes" which were "designed to put black
citizens in a state of near slavery by limiting their rights and privileges."35
The critical question is what might one do if he were an African-
American man in the 1890s, when private whites had free reign36 to enforce
racial segregation in the south. Certainly, he would be aware of the level of
violence. For example, an African American was lynched an average of
once every three days.37  What would he do then? Perhaps he would
consider flight from the South; but where would he go? Would he have the
education to know which direction to travel? Would he have the resources
to move himself and family? Would he make a stand for what he felt was
right, rather than run from his home? If he concluded that escape was not
an option, as the circumstances would likely warrant, were there any legal
remedies to protect himself, his family, and his property?
His legal remedies were limited. His education was limited. Thus, his
participation in the legal process was consequently limited. His only
remaining remedy would be to revolt. This, of course, would be offensive
both to any sense of loyalty and patriotism, as well as to the peaceful spirit
of democracy.38 In addition, revolt would present intense and immediate
risk to the individual and his family.39 Fortunately, people of conscience
and privilege assisted African Americans during these critical times,
32. See infra notes 119-129 and accompanying text (considering whether violence can be
considered in the political process).
33. ROBERT D. LOEVEY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT
ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 3 (1997).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 8 (noting that (1) white leaders accepted lynchings as a way to enforce segregation
in the south; (2) the Civil Rights Cases prevented Congress from intervening; and (3) whites in
the south would not convict one another of these crimes under state laws). See also MICHAL R.
BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 4-5 (1987) (quoting a Judge in 1868 as saying it was
"'almost an impossibility ... to convict a white man of any crime ... where the violence has
been against a black man' " and listing statistics of the frequency of lynchings). See generally
PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA
(2002) (providing a general historical account of lynching in America).
37. LOEVEY, supra note 33, at 8.
38. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (recognizing that "all
men are created equal").
39. See BELKNAP, supra note 36, at 5 (1987) (noting that "[w]hites whipped and even killed
blacks for often trivial reasons" and that "[l]ynching reached a peak in the 1890s and remained at
a relatively high level through the first two decades of the twentieth century").
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providing a support and escape network."
Yet again, in the fifth and sixth decades of the twentieth century,
African Americans from across the nation banded together4' to obtain the
political rights necessary to make real changes in American society, and
then actually to exercise those rights to effect socio-political change.
Different groups with different philosophies and interests had to realize a
common goal, to "keep their eyes on the prize," and to conceptualize
themselves as equals within the American community.42 The movement
was amazing in organization, strategy, and sheer determination.43 No other
modem American movement has achieved such momentum.
Subsequently, as a result of this long process and the dedication of
40. See HAYNES, supra note 28. See also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS:
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS (1954-63) 366-74 (1988) (recounting the killing of three
volunteers, Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwemer, and James Chaney-two Caucasian men and
one African-American man-while they investigated a church burning); TAYLOR BRANCH,
PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS (1963-65) 361-74 (1998) (same); STEVEN
KASHER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A PHOTOGRAPHIC HISTORY 1954-68 at 66 (1996)
(noting that whites joined the initial sit-in demonstrations at the Woolworth's in Greensboro,
N.C.) [hereinafter KASHER]; id. at 96 (noting that the coverage of "Bull Connor's barbarities" at
Birmingham on the headlines of the Washington Post and the New York Times for twelve days
"brought sympathy and support (including money) to the Birmingham movement from many");
JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 347 (1994) (noting that "Northern lawyers began
going south to volunteer"); Joseph I. Lieberman, Why I go to Mississippi, YALE DAILY NEWS
(Oct. 28, 1963) (describing Joseph Lieberman's rationale for supporting the Civil Rights
Movement as a student), available at http://www.joe2004.com/site/DocServer/CivilRightsBack.
doc?doclD=652 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
41. This communication was not always harmonious. The conversations between Dr. King
and Malcolm X, for instance, was at times particularly acrimonious. For example, Malcolm X
referred to the 1963 March on Washington as the "Farce on Washington," objecting on the belief
that "the march had been manipulated by the president to project a prettified [sic] image of racial
harmony." See KASHER, supra note 40, at 121 (1996).
42. See, e.g., id. at 66 (1996) (quoting Franklin McCain, one of the four Woolworth
protestors in Greensboro, N.C., as saying that, after the sit in, "I probably felt better on that day
than I've ever felt in my life. Seems like a lot of feelings of guilt or what-have-you suddenly left
me, and I felt as though I had gained my manhood, so to speak, and not only gained it, but had
developed quite a lot of respect for it.").
43. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM, reprinted in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE 430-38 (James M. Washington ed., Harper Collins 1991) (including an
account of Dr. King's admiration and excitement over the African-American community's
"enthusiasm for freedom" in deciding to commit to the Montgomery bus boycott). See also
Archibald Cox, Direct Action, Civil Disobedience, and the Constitution, in CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 3 (1967) ("Reform would not have moved so fast, if it
progressed at all, without the freedom rides, the sit-in demonstrations, the Birmingham parades,
and the march from Selma to Montgomery.") [hereinafter Cox]; DOUGLAS JOHN MCADAM,
POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE BLACK PROTEST MOVEMENT 1948-1970 app. II at 520-21 (photo.
reprint 1982) (1979) (listing a chronology of sit-in demonstrations during from February 1, 1960
to March 31, 1960); ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 135 fig.4.3 (showing an almost exponential
growth in the number of demonstrations from 1940-1964).
2004] A WAKENING THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS
leaders and members of the community," Congress passed landmark
legislation, 5 thereby granting African Americans many of the rights they
struggled to obtain. The argument that judicial decisions furthered the
Movement, such as Brown v. Board of Education,6 does not weaken the
thesis of this Comment. This is because, while substantive due process is
critically considered as a source of rights, the Comment does not pass upon
other sources of rights in the Constitution, for the simple reason that,
although the highlighted problems with judicial review may attach to any
exercise of the power, the provisions of, for example, the Equal Protection
clause and the Bill of Rights, have text, history, and legislative intent
sufficient to support enforcement of those rights. The recently developed
doctrine of substantive due process is much more suspect on these points
and is therefore reviewed in a critical light in this Comment.
II. ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE
As illustrated by the Civil Rights Movement, social movements can
effectively bring about social change. Next, it is necessary to compare the
efficacy of judicial intervention in bringing about social change. This
Section will show that, under certain conditions,47 judicial intervention
results in one or more of at least five undesirable consequences.
A. Judicial Limitations
First, courts are ill-equipped to make decisions with regard to social,
moral, religious or other political issues because their communication is
limited to the language of the law." Cases directly illustrative on this point
44. For further detail on the lives of five outstanding leaders in the African-American
community see generally JOHN WHITE, BLACK LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA: FROM BOOKER T.
WASHINGTON TO JESSE JACKSON (2d ed. 1990) and JOHN WHITE, BLACK LEADERSHIP IN
AMERICA: 1895-1968 (1985).
45. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)) (including provisions to prevent discrimination in
employment); Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000)) (prohibiting housing discrimination); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-110, § 3(a), 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a) (2000))
(protecting the right to vote); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a) (2000)). See generally BELKNAP, supra note 36, at 205-28
(accounting the process by which the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was passed); LOEVEY, supra note
33 (describing the political process leading to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. See ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 1-41 (describing different constraints and conditions
impacting the Court's effectiveness).
48. See Michael C. Dorf, God and Man in the Yale Dormitories, 84 VA. L. REV. 843, 844
(1998) ("The basic difficulty is that constitutional law is ... 'thinner' than moral and political
discourse generally."); Jay Michealson, On Listening to the Kulturkampf or, How America
Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick even though Romer v. Evans Didn't, 49 DuKE L. J. 1559, 1609
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are those cases that have cited to Lawrence v. Texas.49 The Lawrence
opinion gives a litigant a powerful legal argument that the scope of the
constitutional right to privacy protects the defendant's activities," but this
argument alone is somehow incomplete. Several cases that distinguish
Lawrence show that something essential is missing from the discussion,
and judges are uncomfortable deciding these cases simply as a matter of
law.5" In other words, these judges realize that any resolution of the serious
social issues presented by privacy cases cannot be addressed adequately in
the judicial forum.
One case that draws such a distinction illustrates the difficulty a court
has with making decisions under the Lawrence standard of the right to
privacy. In State v. Freeman,5" a father was charged with having sexual
relations with his twenty year-old daughter, the crime of incest under Ohio
law. 3 Determining that the Lawrence standard recognizes a privacy right
when adults engage in sexual practices with full and mutual consent, the
court distinguished the facts before it from Lawrence on two grounds.54
First, the court noted that Lawrence did not extend a privacy right where
there would be "injury" to a person.5  "In the case of incest," the court
held, "there is injury to persons."56 The court underscored this point by
emphasizing the alleged injuries of the father himself due to incestuous
relationships in his past.5 The court further distinguished the facts of the
case before it by noting that, unlike the sodomy statute in Lawrence, "the
state has a legitimate interest in preventing incest: protecting the family
unit."58 Finally, the court noted that the acts at issue in Lawrence were
admittedly consensual, whereas it was unclear in Freeman whether the
conduct was mutually consensual.
Three major issues starkly present themselves on this reasoning. First,
how did the court decide that there was "injury" to persons? Beyond this,
what is the, standard by which this injury is to be measured and what of the
possibility that there are some cases of incest where the parties are not
(2000) (stating that the sodomy debate is "more properly one of morality than of legality").
49. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
50. But cf Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815-
17 (11 th Cir. 2004) (holding that Lawrence does not recognize a new fundamental right).
51. See U.S. v. Peterson, 294 F. Supp. 2d 797, 807 (D.S.C. 2003); State v. Clark, 161 N.C.
App. 316, 321, 588 S.E.2d 66, 68-69 (2003); State v. Freeman, 801 N.E.2d 906, 909 (Ohio App.
7 Dist. 2003).
52. Freeman, 801 N.E.2d at 906.
53. Id. at 907.
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injured? Second, the court stated that the legitimate state interest
supporting an incest statute was the "protection of the family unit." What,
then, is a "family unit?" Does this rest upon a traditional notion of what
constitutes a family,59 and, if so, would a statute against homosexual
sodomy also be justified by such logic? Finally, assuming the conduct was
consensual (it was, after all, unclear from the facts before the court60),
would that mean this incestuous conduct would come within a Lawrence
zone of privacy?6'
These questions are important because, although the learned judge
settled the parties' rights in the context of the language of the law, the
questions left unresolved are essentially moral, religious, philosophical, and
ethical issues that the judge-indeed, the judiciary as a whole-is woefully
ill equipped to handle.62 Important issues should not be decided in a forum
that cannot consider all the relevant sources that contribute to a satisfactory
social solution. Some have argued that, because the courts are
inappropriate venues for the discussion of the deeper questions of morality,
the matter should be left to community discussion without the involvement
of the government at all.63 However, the legislative process is an adequate
59. See, e.g., Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths toward the Legalization of Same-Sex
Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004, 2024 (2003) (noting the
different treatments of the legal term "family" in the courts); Changing Realities of Parenthood:
The Law's Response to the Evolving American Family and Emerging Reproductive Technologies,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2052, 2059 (2003) (suggesting that "individuals falling well outside the
traditional definitions of parenthood and family can act, in effect, as parents."). See also Lofton
v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 814-15 (1 1th Cir. 2004)
(considering the scope of the "family unit" under Florida law).
60. Freeman, 801 N.E.2d at 909.
61. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that the majority opinion cited "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex" and expressing concern that this reasoning "call[s] into question" a variety of "[s]tate laws
against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication,
bestiality, and obscenity").
62. See Baker v. Wade, 774 F.2d 1285, 1287 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Moral issues should be
resolved by the people, and the laws pertaining thereto should be written or rescinded by the
representatives of the people."). But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Justice Steven's
dissent in Bowers for the proposition that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice.").
63. Michealson, supra note 48, at 1609-10 (suggesting that a "Bowers 11" that would
overrule the first Bowers--essentially the recent Lawrence v. Texas opinion-would provide a
"position of neutrality" and would allow community discussion tools such as "moral censure,
media campaigns, promises of hellfire, philosophical reasoning, recourses to Darwin,
immunological theodicy, stories of roman decadence, pictures of lovely straight children, social
advance, [and] parental love."). The author does not address, however, why this rationale should
apply to every legislative enactment.
In addition, this Comment suggests that citizens who are displeased with current statutes
have exactly the same persuasive tactics that Michaelson suggests the majority should employ.
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and effective forum for this public discussion, if the people have the
incentive to force their representatives to be responsive. 6'
B. Discouragement of Community-based Solutions
Second, where the judiciary intervenes in social debate, the political
and social capacity of the individual within the public sphere will
deteriorate. This is because citizens will be blinded by advancing only
their own political needs and desires, rather than becoming aware of the
needs of the community at large and how their needs fit into the larger
social framework." As one scholar wrote, while in the democratic process,
citizens:
[A]re forced to find or create a common language of purposes and
aspirations, not merely to clothe our private outlook in public
disguise, but to become aware ourselves of its public meaning ....
In the process, we learn to think about the standards themselves,
about our stake in the existence of standards, of justice, of our
community, even of our opponents and enemies in the community;
so that afterwards we are changed. Economic man becomes a
citizen.66
The more courts show a willingness to provide an easy answer to
litigants, the less likely citizens are to take the path of greater resistance
and greater reward by seeking community-based solutions for their
problems. For example, if African-American advocacy groups67 could
have received total relief from the judiciary on a case addressing only their
particularized grievances, they probably would have preferred the instant
legal solution. These groups would not have banded together with the
political and economic grassroots campaigns that ultimately empowered a
Surely, the burden must be on someone to press the public case, and practically, the minority
should bear the burden of persuasion because they are most interested in reforming the law.
64. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1865)
("In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of
opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the Government, though they may
sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection; and serve
to check excesses in the majority."). See also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (noting
that the Supreme Court does "not sit as a 'superlegislature' to second-guess these policy
choices"). See generally Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (holding
that the Due Process Clause does not allow the judiciary to act as a "superlegislature").
65. See generally PUTNAM & FELDSTEIN, supra note I I (detailing a decline in American
social and civic participation).
66. Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1623, 1624 n.7 (1988) (quoting Hannah Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and
Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 347 (1981)).
67. Advocacy groups included the Congress of Racial Equality, the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the
Nation of Islam.
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generation of activists with the knowledge of the power of political
organization and the accompanying personal dignity.68
Although judicial intervention does not prevent groups from working
together in the political process, it provides a disincentive to the process
based solution that provides a deeper, more substantive social solution in
the long run.
C. Reduction of Opportunities for Community Involvement
Similarly, yet distinctly, the public and social sphere will suffer from a
systematic deterioration. Citizens will be denied the opportunity to develop
important social skills critical to a properly functioning democracy:
communication, empathy, and advocacy to and for their peers. This is in
stark contrast to individual advocacy in an elite judicial process. When
citizens participate in the political process, it is often necessary to
communicate with other interested persons and groups to forge coalitions
supporting the group's goal. In litigation, however, one need only
communicate directly to the court. The better scenario, therefore, is for
people to develop communication skills by working with others in their
own community and seeking litigation only as a last resort.
Not only will prevailing litigants be deterred from developing social
advocacy skills, but judicial intervention will create a hostile social
environment by making it difficult for a group to advocate on its own
behalf in its community. As Rosenberg notes:
[T]he data suggest that [court decisions] may mobilize opponents [of
significant social reform]. With civil rights, there was growth in the
membership and activities of pro-segregation groups such as the
White Citizens Councils and the Ku Klux Klan in the years after
Brown. With abortion, the Right to Life movement expanded
rapidly after 1973. While both types of groups existed before Court
actions, they appeared re-invigorated after it. In addition, in the
wake of the Supreme Court's 1989 Webster decision, seen by many
as a threat to continuing access to safe and legal abortion, pro-choice
68. For a specific instance of the recent application of economic pressure, see Press Release,
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, NAACP Boycott of South
Carolina to Continue Despite Vote to Remove Flag from Capitol Dome (May 11, 2000)
(reporting on the "economic boycott of South Carolina since January 1, 2000. More than 200
meetings, conventions and family reunions have been cancelled, resulting in the loss of at least
$20 million" and that the South Carolina legislature decided to remove the confederate flag from
atop the capitol building in Colombia). See also Jeremy Quittner, Cracker Barrel Buckles, THE
ADVOCATE, at 24 (Feb. 4, 2003) (reporting that Cracker Barrel added sexual orientation to its
non-discrimination policy following "years of angry protests from activists and shareholders and
a decade-long boycott by gays and lesbians"), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_m1589/is_2003_Feb_4/ai_97175008 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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forces seemed to gain renewed vigor.69
In the present day, Americans can observe this phenomenon as the
judiciary becomes involved in advancing the gay rights movement.70 The
response has been swift and significantly negative.7 Indeed, some courts
foresaw such consequences even before empirical studies on the point were
performed.72 Thus, while judicial review has the effect of squelching
progressive, genetic social movements as described in the previous Section,
it also has the ironic potential to invigorate reactive, resistive social
movements.
Unnecessary judicial involvement is especially suspect in light of
69. ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 341-42. The Supreme Court's 1989 plurality decision in
Webster, which Rosenberg cites, held that a Missouri law requiring doctors to determine whether
a fetus was viable after the twentieth week of gestation was reasonably related to the legitimate
government interest to prevent aborting a viable fetus. See also BELKNAP, supra note 36, at 28
(noting that the Ku Klux Klan experienced a Southern revival following Brown v. Board of
Education); Timothy R. Johnson and Andrew D. Martin, The Public's Conditional Response to
Supreme Court Decision, in AM. POL. SCI. REV., June 1998, at 2 (summarizing a previous study
that "[t]he effect of Roe was further crystallization of issue preferences and greater homogeneity
of within-group beliefs ... [f]rom this they conclude, in line with the structural response
hypothesis and contextual theory, that the Court's decision polarized group attitudes toward
abortion") (citation omitted).
70. See generally Lawrence v, Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute
making it a crime for persons of the same sex to engage in certain sexual conduct violated the
Due Process Clause); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely
because they would marry someone of the same sex violated the state's constitution).
71. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004) (suggesting
that, if "[a]ctivist judges" insist upon defining marriage "by court order, without regard for the
will of the people and their elected representatives," resort to the constitutional amendment
process would be appropriate), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/01/20040120-7.htmnl (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Fifty-state Rundown on
Gay Marriage Laws, at www.stateline.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2004) (noting that Missouri passed
a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage on August 3, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); The Battle Over Same Sex Marriage, at http://www.pbs.org/
newshourlbblaw/gaymarriage (Nov. 8, 2004) (noting that voters in Arkansas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, and Oregon
approved amendments on their ballots in the 2004 election and noting that President Bush will
continue to press for a federal amendment banning gay marriage) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
72. In Baker v. Wade, 774 F.2d. 1285, 1285 (5th Cir. 1985), the court stated:
Moral issues should be resolved by the people, and the laws pertaining thereto should be
written or rescinded by the representatives of the people. Were a federal court to decree
that the United States Constitution decides the issue and override the opinion of those of
the different view, the natural course of the public debate and the developing consensus
would be misshapen. The feelings of the losers, perhaps still in the majority, could be
elevated by the nature of the fiat, and their frustrations might be vented upon the winners
to a degree that increased the burdens of the latter beyond the consequences endured
under the invalidated statute.
774 F.2d at 1285 (emphasis added).
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research that indicates that people are unlikely to change their opinions on
a subject once they have received information sufficient to form an
opinion.73 If this is indeed the case, then it is all the more important for the
community to discuss these ideas without influence from an elite class of
judges that hold a position of respect among the American public.74 The
Supreme Court has had difficulty making up its institutional mind in the
past.75 The first decision on any particular issue will probably "help[ ]
individuals elaborate their opinions," therefore "subsequent decisions
within the same issue area-even if they overrule an initial landmark
decision-will have little effect on public opinion."76 Rather than risking
polarizing the opponents of those who seek social reform as well as
contributing to the "elaboration" process only to unsuccessfully attempt to
change the public's mind after the fact,77 the courts should be willing to
allow the political process room to operate.
D. Erosion of Political Responsibility
Fourth, judicial intervention provides political representatives a way
out of politically uncomfortable situations. The representative can deflect
responsibility to the judiciary's decision, rather than take a politically risky
stance on the matter.78 Although some cases that come before the judiciary
73. See Johnson & Martin, supra note 69, at 300-01 (describing the process of forming an
opinion and referring to it as "elaboration").
74. See id. at 300 (citing "research demonstrating that even people who know very little
about the Supreme Court often hold it in high regard.").
75. Compare, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (validating the state
legislature's act to criminalize sodomy) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896)
(validating "separate but equal" treatment by upholding a statute providing for racially segregated
railway accommodations) with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (invalidating the state legislature's act
to criminalize sodomy) and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (invalidating
"separate but equal" treatment by striking down racial segregation in public schools).
76. See Johnson & Martin, supra note 69, at 300.
77. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing a number of cases
that relied on the Supreme Court's first judgment on the validity of laws enacted pursuant to a
moral rationale, then remarking that "[w]hat a massive disruption of the current social order,
therefore, the overruling of Bowers entails.").
78. See, e.g., JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 441
(1981). Among the quotes collected in this source, a former Representative declares that "[s]ince
only the most politically secure congressman can afford to offend constituents-and since there
are so many ways to offend them-natural survival instincts dictate that a congressman will duck
any tough issues that he can." Id. (quoting Les Aspin, Why Doesn't Congress Do Something, 15
FOREIGN POL'Y 70, 73 (1974)). Another Representative stated that, "Congress usually won't
face up to a problem before it has to, until it is forced to." Id. (quoting Donald W. Reigle, Jr. and
Trevor Ambrister, A Congressman's Diary, in DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY: READING IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 80 (Peter Collier ed., 1976)). See also Thomas G. West, The
Constitutionalism of the Founders Versus Modem Liberalism, 6 NEXUS 91-95 (noting an
analogous problem of congressional shirking of responsibility by passing broad laws empowering
administrative agencies to act). Cf JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 109 (Da Capo
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should be settled as a matter of constitutional law (some rights are clearer
than others,)79 special attention should nevertheless be devoted to the
possibility of abuse by public officials, especially where the source of the
constitutional right is suspect. Because legislative officials are intended to
be directly responsive to the will of the people,"0 judicial interference
assists the legislative branch in abdicating its constitutionally assigned
role.8"
It is also true that this deflection of responsibility does not occur in
every case. In fact, in some instances, public officials will be invigorated
by a judicial decision.82 Even if this is true, however, it is the people, not
Press 1974) (1901) ("[By exercising judicial restraint], the court will help, as nothing else can, to
fix the spot where responsibility lies, and to bring down on that precise locality the thunderbolt of
popular condemnation").
79. Cf James B. Thayer, The Origin And Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) ("[The Court] can only disregard the Act [of Congress]
when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a
very clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational question."); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 35-46 (Yale
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962) (detailing the judicial development of this "clear mistake" rule).
80. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 1 (requiring members of the House to be elected "every
second Year by the People"); U.S. CONST. art. I., § 3, cl. I (providing for a six year term for
Senators).
81. Beyond simply serving as a representative to their constituencies, Congress may also
have a constitutional responsibility to engage in the constitutional debate. See MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9 (1999) (quoting President Lincoln's
opposition to Dred Scott and his position that "the people will have ceased to be their own rulers"
if they simply accept the decisions of the Supreme Court as law applicable beyond the litigants in
any particular case) (quoting Lincoln's First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861), in A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 9 (James D.
Richardson, ed., 1897)); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979,
985-86 (1987) ("Each of the three coordinate branches of government created and empowered by
the Constitution-the executive and legislative no less than the judicial-has a duty to interpret
the Constitution in the performance of its official functions. In fact, every official takes an oath
precisely to that effect."); Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., Congress, the Court, and the Constitution: Has
Congress Abdicated Its Constitutional Responsibilities?, Lecture Before the Heritage Foundation
(Nov. 29, 1990) (stating that "to say the courts exist to give meaning to the laws and the
Constitution is not to embrace the idea that only courts can give meaning to the laws and the
Constitution.") available at http://www.heritage.orgtResearch/GovernmentReformHL299.cfm
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
82. See, e.g., Kevin Clarke, Suspended Sentence: How the U.S. Almost Put Capital
Punishment to Death, (1998) (stating that "[iun response to his court's decision, an angry
[California Governor] Reagan neatly capsulated the debate that has swirled around this issue
since Furman, calling it a 'case of the courts setting themselves above the people and the
legislature' and vowing 'revenge.' "), available at http://salt.claretianpubs.org/
issues/deathp/hiscap.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Nebraska Governor
Mike Johanns, State of the State Address (Jan. 11, 2001) ("I also ask this body to make a bold
commitment to honor the life of the unborn. I, like many in our state, was saddened by the U.S.
Supreme Court decision striking down Nebraska's law banning partial-birth abortion ...."),
available at http://gov.nol.org/speeches/speeches200l/ sos0 1112001 .html. (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); News Conference, Department of Justice (May 1, 2002) (quoting
Attorney General Ashcroft as saying "[o]n April the 16th, the United States Supreme Court
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judges, who should motivate representatives. In this sense, if judges
become the motivators of legislative and executive representatives, then the
judiciary will not simply have usurped the role of an independent branch of
government, but of the people themselves. In view of the fact that judges
cannot mechanically apply the law and must rely, to some extent, on their
own subjective value systems and experiences, this is simply an
unacceptable amplification of the preferences of the learned legal class
from which judges hail. At least one judge has conceded that personal
preferences cannot be eliminated from the process of judging, even where
the judge recognizes that subjectivity exists and commits himself to the
control thereof.83
Thus, even if a court decision stimulates the political debate, the
judiciary will have usurped the role of the people in establishing matters of
legislative and/or executive importance.' It is not for the courts to decide
what the matters of the public debate shall be; rather, the determination is
for the constituents of policymakers85
E. Inefficient Allocation of Resources
From a practical standpoint, social advocates realize that limited
resources must be applied in the most efficient method to affect a particular
result.86 If the judiciary induces the people into thinking that the courts can
issued a decision that did grave injury to our ability to protect children from exploitation. The
Court struck down provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act, a law passed with
bipartisan support in 1996 ...."), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/ashcroft-childpom.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Press Release, Oklahoma House of
Representatives Media Division, OKC Legislator Condemns Supreme Court For Striking Down
Texas' Sodomy Law (June 26, 2003), available at http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/house/
NEWS6328.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
83. Edward M. Chen has weighed in on the issue of subjectivity and the judiciary. Edward
M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (2003). He
states:
In short, my understandings and perceptions, and perhaps my subconscious predilections,
are fashioned to a significant extent by my life experiences. And although a judge's duty
is to recognize those predilections and control them, it is simply unrealistic to pretend
that life experiences do not affect one's perceptions in the process of judging.
Id.
84. See ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 229-41 (citing Justice O'Connor's belief that judicial
decisions can place an item on the public agenda, and concluding that "evidence for extra-judicial
influence is lacking"). See also Michaelson, supra note 48, at 1608, 1611 (arguing that a court
decision can serve to stimulate the political debate).
85. See STEPHEN E. FRANTZICH & STEPHEN L. PERCY, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: THE
POLITICAL GAME 339-40 (Stan Stoga & Roger B. Wolkoff eds., 1994) (explaining that members
of Congress gain the power to set agendas through a seniority system and highlighting the
importance of committees to enacting legislation).
86. See ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 339 (noting the Rev. Dr. M. L. King, Jr.'s complaint
of the expense of pursuing judicial action). See also Dennis J. Hutchinson, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 157,
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bring about social changes, 7 advocacy groups will be deceived into
expending large amounts of resources in a litigation strategy that may well
make their real task,88 true community understanding and acceptance, even
more difficult.
If the judiciary in fact behaves as "fly paper" to obstruct groups,89 then
it is obviously not acting as a defender of the political process, but is
serving to trap those interests that would otherwise prove successful with
empty promises of social change at the inflated cost of litigation. The
courts would thus hinder the goal of empowering citizens to advocate for
and with others effectively in the democratic process.90
F. Summary
Taken together, these five adverse consequences of judicial
intervention are quite disturbing. These consequences are especially
worrisome when one considers that the effect of denying the opportunity to
learn of democracy will not be isolated; rather, parents, not having learned
the democratic savvy necessary to become true "community creatures,"
will be unable to teach their children how to participate effectively in their
own community. As the Rev. Dr. M. L. King, Jr. wrote, "[w]e in this
generation must do the work and in doing it stimulate our children to learn
and acquire higher levels of skill and technique."'" Thus, these negative
consequences may well resonate throughout future generations.9 2  It is
critical, therefore, to consider how the courts can avoid premature
interjections into the political process.
168 (2001) (paraphrasing Justice Thurgood Marshall, in an interview, that "his own campaign
against Jim Crow... had produced empty or unstable victories.").
87. By this point, such an inducement has been shown to be quite questionable.
88. This is to say nothing of the expense to the public that comes from extensive litigation,
as the legislature is a more efficient avenue to handle broad social issues.
89. See ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 343 (concluding that "[s]ocial reformers, with limited
resources, forgo other options when they elect to litigate. These options are mainly political and
involve mobilizing citizens to participate more effectively .... [W]hile such exercises may make
for fine reading in constitutional law textbooks, they seldom bring reform any closer.").
90. See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
91. KING, supra note43, at6ll.
92. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) ("As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.")
(emphasis added).
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Any solutions to the repercussions of judicial intervention must begin
with an examination of the judicial perception of the judicial institution
itself. As Professor Tribe observed, "[t]he [Supreme] Court's self-
confidence in what it sees as matters constitutional is matched only by its
disdain for the meaningful participation of other actors in constitutional
debate."93 Although the judiciary has a duty to interpret the Constitution, it
must also respect the other democratic branches. The judiciary must check
its own self-image, if for no other reason than that no one else can
meaningfully check it. It is true that there technically are some checks on
the judiciary. These include impeachment,94  the possibility of
constitutional amendment,95 the judicial appointment process,96 and the
judiciary's limited jurisdiction.97  However, once judges have been
appointed, it is difficult to check them. For example, impeachment
requires a supermajority, 98  amendment requires a significant and
cumbersome effort,99 and judges cannot have their salaries diminished
during their terms in office."° Therefore, the only useful checks are the
93. Laurence H. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB: Through the Looking Glass, in BUSH v. GORE: A
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 62 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); see DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note
14, at 445 (stating that "[o]n my arrival in the United States, I was struck with surprise to discover
the extent to which merit was common among those who were governed and how little there was
among those who governed."); ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 2-3 (noting the possibility of the
"mystification" of the legal profession). See also sources cited in note 81 (noting that the Court is
not the only institution charged with interpreting the Constitution).
94. See U.S. CONST. art I1, § 1 (providing that judges shall hold their offices while on "good
[b]ehavior"). However, over the course of American history, only "[s]ixty-one federal judges or
Supreme Court Justices have been investigated for impeachment, of whom thirteen have been
impeached and seven convicted." David Barton, Impeachment of Federal Judges, at
http://www.wallbuilders.com/resources/search/detail.php?ResourcelD=69 (last visited Nov. 10,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). See also FRANTZICH & PERCY, supra note
85, at 343 (explaining the impeachment process).
95. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing the process by which the Constitution is to be
amended).
96. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for ... ").
97. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that, except in those cases where the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction, "the [Slupreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.").
98. See sources cited in note 94.
99. See U.S. CONST. art V.
100. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges ... shall ... receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
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appointment process and the limitation of jurisdiction. 101 The appointment
process is somewhat weak, as some candidates will not voice their
positions on issues during questioning. The appointment process also
provides no recourse after a judgment has been issued. The option to limit
jurisdiction is also a thorny choice, as the rights of the citizens will be
impaired if they do not have access to the courts.
Moreover, given the potential reach and power of judicial review, the
judiciary exercises power that simply cannot be checked, and would
therefore only be limited by public perceptions of the institution's
legitimacy. After all, a court can simply invalidate or refuse to recognize
any legislative or executive attempt to check its power since, by its own
pronouncement, it is the final authority on the interpretation of the




The second trait the judicial institution must strive to achieve is
patience. Two cases serve to underscore the impatience of the judiciary in
waiting for the political process to operate.
First, in Frontiero v. Richardson,"3 the Court relied on the volume of
legislation Congress passed"° extending protections on the basis of sex to
"conclude that classifications based upon sex ... are inherently suspect,
and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."'0 5  The
concurrence questioned if the Court should intervene where the Equal
Rights Amendment ("ERA") was already working its way through the
political machinery. 0 6  "By acting prematurely and unnecessarily," the
opinion stressed:
[T]he Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time
when state legislatures, functioning within the traditional democratic
process, are debating the proposed Amendment. It seems to me that
this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political
101. See 149 CONG. REC. S2030 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum)
(during confirmation hearing of Miguel Estrada, noting that Estrada has refused to disclose his
judicial philosophy).
102. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 157 (1803) (establishing the principle
of judicial review); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (reaffirming the principle of
judicial review and holding that the Supreme Court is the final authority on questions of
constitutional law).
103. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
104. The Court specifically mentioned the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act of
1963, and the pending Equal Rights Amendment. Id. at 687.
105. Id. at 688.
106. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect
appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes.1"7
Secondly, in Lawrence, the Court referred to international trends in
supporting the decision." 8 In addition, the Court noted that five state
courts had refused to follow Bowers °9 and the national trend to repeal the
laws in general.11° All of this points to the fact that people, pursuant to the
political process, were reaching the result the Court wanted all on their
own. Just as Justice Powell pointed out in Frontiero,"' the Court again
stepped in at just the time when state legislatures were debating important
issues on their own.
1 2
Simply put, trends in public opinion will eventually be enshrined in
legislation. ' All it takes is a bit of patience on the part of an
understandably eager judiciary.
To those that argue that constitutional "rights" cannot wait, it is well
for them to consider the adverse consequences explored hereinabove, and,
specifically, the possibility of polarization. Is it really best to have the
judiciary jump to the conclusion when individuals may become polarized,
making the community less comfortable for proponents of social reform?114
It would be an implausible counterargument to say that the mere extension
of constitutional rights will afford peace and a comfortable living
environment. In the past, this may have been true, as people lived far away
from each other and came into contact with each other less. Today,
however, Americans mostly live in urban centers and are in constant
contact with each other, physically as well as technologically. It is far
better to have a community consensus than to have a dubious "right"
107. Id.
108. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003). See generally Symposium, Has
the Supreme Court gone too far?, COMMENTARY MAGAZINE 14, at http://committeeforjustice.
org/contents/news/news 100103 commentary.shtml (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter COMMENTARY
MAGAZINE] ("As for permitting judges to conform domestic law to foreign law, that is to
abandon national sovereignty, something almost no political leader would undertake to defend.")
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
109. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 2483.
110. Id.
111. See note 106 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, Nationwide, Sodomy Laws in Full Retreat, at
http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn28/nationwide.htmil (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) (describing the
trend of state legislatures repealing sodomy statutes) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Molly Hennesy-Fiske, State's Sodomy Statute Could Fall: A Repeal Effort Will Be
Discussed at a Town Hall Meeting Tonight in Raleigh, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), April
15, 2003, at Cl (describing a town hall meeting to discuss the possible repeal of North Carolina's
sodomy statute).
113. See COMMENTARY MAGAZINE, supra note 108.
114. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (removing the voting issues from the
state political process, which would have allowed for an alternative "resolution").
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conferred by the judiciary. 5 Where the Constitution is not clear and
judges must stray from the "language and design" of the document to find
rights," 6 it is better not to make the environment worse for the citizens than
it otherwise would be. For example, some gay rights advocates agree that
patience is an important component of social change. Some fear that "too
rapid a march toward [gay] marriage equality will engender a popular
backlash.""' 7 Justice Ginsburg also advocated for a moderate approach to
the role of the judiciary in pushing social change." 8
B. Political Process and Revolution
Given the benefits of the political process and its primacy in our
democratic system, courts should encourage it." 9 However, it is important
to realize that democratic advocacy can sometimes lead to violence if the
115. See Baker v. Wade, 774 F.2d 1285, 1287 (5th Cir. 1985) (case predicting that the
consequences could be worse for the winners of litigation if the majority of society is polarized
and energized by judicial action).
116. "The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003). See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (quoting
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)); see also
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("By extending constitutional protection to
an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of
public debate and legislative action. We must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are
asked to break new ground in this field.") (citations and quotations omitted).
117. See Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex
Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2004, 2011 (2003).
118. Justice Ginsburg believes that "the court should 'reinforce,' or, at most, 'moderately add
impetus' to social change." See Carey Olney, Better Bitch Than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Feminism, and VMI, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 97, 127 (2000-01) (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Constitutional Adjudication as a Means of Realizing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under
the Law, 14 TOCQUEVILLE REV. 125, 134 (1993)).
119. Of course, the whole of this Comment rests on the premise that political participation is
an inherent good in our society. See PUTNAM, supra note 11, at 31-47 (detailing a decline in
American social and civic participation); Brest, supra note 66, at 1623 (favorably presenting
"civic republicanism"); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values,
71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 704 (1991) (same); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988) (exploring "civic republicanism"). However, some have criticized this as unrealistic
because Americans do not force participation in the democracy. See Brce Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1034-35 (1984).
However, the closest Americans have come in the past to forced participation is the
forced consideration of social issues through the mass media. This at least increases the
likelihood that people will participate. For instance, some Caucasians became involved in the
Civil Rights Movement upon seeing images on the television-a new and powerful medium of
forcing people to confront social issues in the comforts of their own home. See ROSENBERG,
supra note 20, at 113 fig.4.1 (showing increased coverage of the civil rights movement in
magazines). For a sampling of representative images in the media, see generally KASHER, supra
note 20 (documenting the Civil Rights Movement with a number of images from the period).
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political procedures provide no remedy for the oppressed group. 0 A court
might find the exercise of judicial review proper to prevent a complete
breakdown of the democratic process, for example, a resort to violence. An
important illustration of the need to reach the proper balance of judicial
intervention is best highlighted by the contrasting scenarios in Cooper v.
Aaron" and Bush v. Gore.'22 In Cooper, Arkansas state officials, by'
forcibly and illegally refusing to follow a federal court order to integrate
Little Rock High School, behaved in a manner that would have led to
violence.' The Florida state government in Bush v. Gore opted to provide
more time, under state law, to reach a legal conclusion regarding the hotly
contested results of the 2000 presidential election in a non-violent
environment. Thus, the democratic process was protected by judicial
intervention in Cooper v. Aaron, whereas the political process was "short-
circuited" in Bush v. Gore even while the process was yet properly
functioning. 1
24
Considering these two cases together raises questions of whether, and
to what extent, courts should consider the potential for violence as a proper
basis for judicial action. There is a fine line between participation and
violence, between demonstration and riots. Because Congress is given the
power to squelch rebellions and insurrections, 25 preserving the peace is
more of a law enforcement or public safety issue than a judicial one in the
absence of legislative action. The courts must try to force the legislative
branch to respond to "violence" by declining to intervene and squelching
the violence itself. When Congress must respond to public demonstrations,
by characterizing them as violence, this plunges congressional officials
back into the political process. The officials' respective constituencies will
assess the legislative characterization of the situations and actions in
response thereto. Representatives will then be accountable for suppressing
any political discourse they improperly deemed "violence." In fact, if the
unaccountable judiciary elects to do otherwise and suppresses the political
120. See sources cited in note 36.
121. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (per curiam).
122. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
123. Arkansas Governor Faubus, who called the National Guard to defy the integration of the
local high school, proclaimed, "Now begins the crucifixion!" TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE
WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS (1954-63) 224 (1988). After this, "[b]y midmorning,
angry whites had beaten at least two Negro reporters, broken many of the schools' windows and
doors, and come so close to capturing the Negro students that the Little Rock police evacuated
them in desperation. Central High was segregated again before lunch, and students joined the
mob in cheers of victory." Id. See generally BELKNAP, supra note 36, at 4-5 (detailing the
violence in Little Rock and elsewhere after the Brown decision).
124. See Tribe, supra note 93, at 61 (noting that the court may have made "a deliberate
decision to short-circuit" the democratic process) (emphasis omitted).
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. See also sources cited in note 9.
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process by "resolving" issues, that could be a sophisticated censoring by
removing the object of the debate." 6 Nevertheless, if the political process
is not functioning properly, and demonstrations have turned truly violent,
courts should take action to restore a peaceful functioning of the political
process.127
The whole of this discussion of what constitutes "political
participation" illustrates another problem scholars have identified with the
courts attempting to exercise judicial review to repair failings of the
political process. The anatomy of the political process, scholars argue, is
so complex as not to allow for diagnosis of problems or prescription of
solutions by judges. 28  However, so long as people have the ability to
participate peacefully and fully, the political process is essentially working
as the Constitution requires.
2 9
C. A Proper Conception of Due Process
As an initial matter, Professor Ely has pointed out that the only proper
interpretation of the Due Process clause is procedural due process.13 °
Indeed, the text of the Constitution supports the learned professor's view."'
The professor also noted, however, the attendant judicial restraint issues if
126. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
127. For example, this might be a foundation for Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). For
where the other levels of government-in that case, the state-are violent, it would seem
appropriate for the court to repair the political process through judicial review. See sources cited
in note 123 (describing the level of violence of the facts from which Cooper emerged).
128. See Richard L. Hasen, The "Political Market" Metaphor and Election Law: A Comment
on Issacharoff and Pildes, 50 STAN. L. REV. 719, 730 (1998) (concluding that there is not an
appropriate standard by which to measure competitiveness).
129. Cox, supra note 43, at 6.
130. ELY, supra note 12, at 18 ("Familiarity breeds inattention, and we apparently need
periodic reminding that 'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green
pastel redness' "). It is quite odd, indeed. Justice Scalia, in several concurrences, has argued:
I think it unlikely that the procedures constitutionally "due," with regard to an arrest,
consist of anything more than what the Fourth Amendment specifies; but petitioner has
- in any case not invoked "procedural" due process.. . I reject the proposition that the Due
Process Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather than merely guarantees
certain procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty.
See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp. 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
131. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV ("without due process of law") (emphasis added).
This phrasing suggests that there is a "due process" for every governmental action. Although the
text might suggest that the required due process is different for each interest (life, liberty, etc.), it
nevertheless supposes that some of level of process would be sufficient (in other words, due). See
also sources cited in note 125. Cf The Magna Carta c.39 (1215) ("No free man shall be arrested
or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way victimized, neither will we go
attack him or send any one to attack him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land.") (emphasis added).
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courts are permitted to prescribe different levels of process for different
interests without guidance. 132  Beyond this, substantive due process
presents serious separation of powers issues. Justice Holmes recognized
this problem when the doctrine of substantive due process made its first
debut.133 Finally, the extension of substantive due process presents
significant federalism issues, as rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause are applied against the states.'
D. Representation Reinforcement and Process Failure
Professor Ely's constitutional theory, as laid out in the seminal book
Democracy and Distrust, calls for the judiciary to protect "discrete and
insular minorities" from the tyranny of the majority. 135  The Court first
acknowledged this theory in the now famous fourth footnote of United
States v. Carolene Products Co. 136 Although the Court reduced the level of
scrutiny for economic regulation in Carolene Products, it suggested in that
footnote that courts should defer to the legislative branch when the process
was working fairly.
Although this approach is encouraging insofar as it focuses the
Court's attention on ensuring that the political process is receptive to
participation by all groups of citizens, it is problematic in at least two
respects. First, Ely's theory might allow courts to focus on the result of the
process (i.e., the law at issue), rather than on the process itself.'37 That is,
the theory might be used to justify striking an offending statute, while it
should only invalidate barriers to participation in the political process (e.g.,
prohibitions on the right to vote, exclusion from public meetings, etc.).'38
132. ELY, supra note 12, at 19.
133. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (expressing
displeasure at the Court's interpretation of the Constitution and stating that "[tihe Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics").
134. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that "[a] construction which ... turns [due process] into a summary of the specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights would ... tear up by the roots much of the fabric of law in the
several States, and would deprive the States of opportunity for reforms in legal process designed
for extending the area of freedom"); see also Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of Incorporation, 33 U.
RICHMOND L. REV. 525, 533-36 (1999) (discussing incorporation as it relates to judicial
activism).
135. ELY, supra note 12, at 135-79 (1980).
136. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.").
137. See Ron Replogle, The Scope of Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1592, 1592 (1992) ("When that process is impaired, judges may nullify political
decisions without imposing their values on the citizenry so long as they protect interests to which
the political process would respond were it operating soundly.") (emphasis added).
138. See ELY, supra note 12, at 180 (1980) (discussing whether a right to travel should be
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Secondly, courts should be certain that they are in fact dealing with a
discrete and insular minority,'39 because of the adverse consequences
attendant to the exercise of judicial review.1
40
These consequences could actually thrust a group that was not truly
politically impotent'4 ' into just such a state. For example, a process theorist
has stated that one factor useful to identify a "perfect market" is "when
affected interests are organized, repeat players."' 42  If, however, discrete
and insular minorities are defined as those who are unorganized and first
time players in the political structure, the courts will give them their
remedy and they will have no need to become "organized, repeat players."
limited to a right to travel for political purposes).
139. See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 316
(1990) (acknowledging some discomfort with "some awkwardly drawn line between 'interest
groups' and 'unprotected minorities' "). Professor Ely, for example, argued against finding that
women were discrete and insular minorities. In fact, he felt that women were neither discrete nor
insular. ELY, supra note 12, at 164-70. On the other hand, Ely appears prepared to subject laws
affecting homosexuals to invalidation. Id. at 162-64.
Other scholars have called for expanding the categories of people that classify as
"discrete and insular minorities." See, e.g., Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the
Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 263, 285 n.218 (1992) (comparing restrictions on marriage between homosexuals to
miscegenation statutes declared unconstitutional and arguing that homosexuals may be a quasi-
suspect class); Erwin Chemerinsky, Under the Bridges of Paris: Economic Liberties Should Not
Be Just for the Rich, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 31, 38-39 (2003) ("The poor are truly a 'discrete and
insular minority.' The poor possess little political power, and are obviously underrepresented in
legislatures. By definition, they lack money to give contributions to political candidates or to set
up political action committees."); Olga Popov, Towards a Theory of Underclass Review 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1095, 1098 (1991) (advocating for a review of laws that negatively impact the
underclass).
Conversely, some scholars have argued that some groups should not be considered
discrete and insular minorities. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The
Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (2003) ("Big American business
firms are not discrete and insular minorities. They have exceptional access to influence in
legislatures, administrative agencies, and the courts through government advisory commissions,
trade associations, lobbies, and lawyers."); Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the
ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213, 1218 (2003) ("Individuals with disabilities, as currently defined,
do not constitute a 'discrete and insular minority' and are not easily identifiable as a class.");
Colleen Carlton Smith, Zelman's Evolving Legacy: Selective Funding of Secular Private Schools
in State School Choice Programs, 89 VA. L. REV. 1953, 1994 (2003) (arguing that "laws that
make a distinction only between religious and secular pursuits do not" [raise constitutional
concerns] in a nation where "the vast majority of people claim to be religious").
The courts have already turned away some claims by groups that they are "discrete and
insular minorities." See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (holding
that elderly persons do not constitute a discrete and insular minority).
140. See sources cited in notes 44-86, 110-113 and accompanying text.
141. Where the group is already unable to exert political influence, this is less problematic.
One particularly clear example is aliens, who do not have the fight to vote. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). Another compelling example is the prosecution of Asian
minorities in the late nineteenth century. See Eric L. Muller, Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U.
L. REV. 1017, 1078 (2003).
142. See Levmore, supra note 139, at 306.
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Stated differently, a court is most ineffective in ushering change where the
group is unable to persuade the legislative branch of the relief it seeks.
43
If affording a nebulous constitutional right to the plaintiffs in such an
instance did not result in negative consequences for the plaintiffs or the
community at large, this would be less troubling. However, we have
identified a number of negative consequences that could serve to make the
plaintiffs' communities more disparaging, their lives more difficult, and
their goals more distant."4
Thus, for the plaintiffs' sake, as well as for the good of the community
at large, plaintiffs challenging legislation should bear the burden to
illustrate their political isolation before the court takes notice of a "discrete
and insular" status.
E. Justice Black's Incorporation
One possible solution to the judiciary's tendency to suppress the
political process through its exercise of judicial review, especially in light
of the expanding law of substantive due process, is to adopt Justice Black's
view which incorporates the entire Bill of Rights and applies it to state
action. The Supreme Court incorporated the Double Jeopardy Clause 15 as
a part of substantive due process in Palko v. Connecticut."'6 However, it
has refused to accept Justice Black's total incorporation theory,"'7 instead
propounding a number of indeterminative rationales for applying some
constitutional protections to the states while ignoring others. These
rationales include incorporating only those protections that are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,""' 8 those where failure to apply the
protection "shocks the conscience"' 49 of the court, those which will not
create a "font of tort law," those which should apply due to "tradition and
conscience of our people,"'5 ° and those which ensure "personal
autonomy,"'' thereby exposing many public enactments to a finding of
143. ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 338 n.2 (quoting Justice Jackson during Brown oral
argument that "this case is here for the reason that action couldn't be obtained from Congress,"
and noting that Professor Ely's theory "frees the Court to act in precisely those instances where it
most unlikely to be of any help.").
144. See notes 47-92, 110-113 and accompanying text.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
146. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
147. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1947) (concluding that the Fifth
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination is not a protection against state action through
the Fourteenth Amendment).
148. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
149. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
150. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
151. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
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unconstitutionality. 5 Although no other Justice has supported Justice
Black's theory of total incorporation,'53 the Court should reconsider
substantive due process 114 jurisprudence in light of the effect of the exercise
of judicial review on the democratic process.1
5
Justice Frankfurter argued that total incorporation would offend
principles of federalism.1 56  To the extent that this is true, the benefits of
total incorporation outweigh the offense to federalist principles. First,
instead of paying simple lip service to judicial restraint, there will be bright
line rules that constrain judges against varying subjective preferences.
157
Secondly, applying the Bill of Rights to state action will curb abuse of
power by a state and thereby increase the ability of the people to participate
in the federal and state 58 political processes.'59 A citizen is only so free to
participate as the weakest protections they have against governmental
abuse of power. A citizen would be uncomfortable participating at either
the state or federal levels of government without the full benefit of the
provision of the Bill of Rights. 6 ' Finally, if Justice Frankfurter could have
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.").
152. See sources cited in note 13 and accompanying text.
153. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 304 n.20 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Judges should not limit their consideration to substantive due process. Other exercises
of judicial review also curtail the operation of the political process. However, to the extent these
exercises of judicial review are closer to the "language and design" of the Constitution, there
would appear to be less cause for concern. See notes 47-92, 110-13 and accompanying text.
155. The Court has recognized that it should be careful in breaking new ground with
substantive due process because of notions of judicial restraint. See Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). However, true limits on judicial review are clearly defined
jurisprudential limits, rather than general principle of judicial restraint without any boundaries.
156. In Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947), Justice Frankfurter concurred,
arguing:
A construction which gives to due process no independent function but turns it into a
summary of the specific provision of the Bill of Rights would ... tear up by the roots
much of the fabric of law in the several States, and would deprive the States of
opportunity for reforms in legal process designed for extending the area of freedom.
157. See notes 47-92, 110-13 and accompanying text.
158. James Madison explained how the protections of both the federal and state governments
provide citizens with "double security" against tyranny. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James
Madison) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1865) ("In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments ... [h]ence a double
security arises to the rights of the people."). Additional protections at both the state and federal
level appear consistent with this view.
159. The Court has effectively "selectively" incorporated most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights since Palko. These rights include the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable
search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment
rights to counsel, a speedy, public trial, to confront witnesses, and to jury trials in criminal cases,
and the Eight Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishments and excessive bail. See
FARBER, supra note 11, at 398-99. Even so, a total incorporation approach would still be
exclusive, thus limiting judicial review and the negative consequences attendant thereto.
160. Provisions that have not been incorporated include "the Second Amendment guarantee
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foreseen the present day, an exclusive incorporation would perhaps have
been more to his liking than the modern doctrine. For, at least under total
exclusive incorporation, there would have been a definite limit to the extent
of offense to federalist principles. Today, the courts are free to continue
expanding substantive due process, despite having already incorporated
most of the Bill of Rights.1
6'
Thus, a total incorporation of the Bill of Rights is justified because the
people will be empowered to bring about changes without judicial
overreaching making it more difficult for citizens to bring about true social
change.1 62  In addition, such an approach will also forbid further
encroachment of federalism principles. Finally, total incorporation
provides the court with a clear mandate, checking its reach into the
democratic process.
F. Holistic Representation Reinforcement
Finally, each branch of government should, pursuant to its own duty to
interpret the Constitution,'63  strive to maintain a true democratic
environment in which people are free to participate. The other branches
should not simply rely on the courts to protect the democratic process.'
64
For example, while Congress is the branch constitutionally entrusted with
policymaking, it can still support the democratic process by enacting
constitutionally sound policies. Such wisdom includes taking care not to
erode the civil liberties of the people through the exercise of even
legitimate legislative power. 16  Statutes like the PATRIOT Act will
intimidate political dissenters because of the possibility of abuse.'66
Similarly, the executive branch can support freedom of participation by
refraining from pursuing policies that intimidate citizens, such as labeling
citizens "enemy combatants."' 67 It requires no great intellectual leap for a
of a right to bear arms, the Fifth Amendment requirement of a grand jury indictment for major
crimes, and the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases." FARBER, supra note 11, at
298-99.
161. Id.
162. This is quite aside from the persuasive reasoning advanced by Justice Black concerning
the Amendment's legislative history. See Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46, 73, (1947) (Black,
J., dissenting). See generally Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993) (arguing, on the basis of the intent of the
principal sponsor of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the Bill of Rights should be incorporated).
163. See sources cited in note 78 and accompanying text.
164. Id.
165. See generally Jeremy C. Smith, Comment, The USA PATRIOT Act: Violating
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Protected by the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing
National Security, 82 N.C. L. REv. 412 (2003) (criticizing the PATRIOT Act as unconstitutional
and unwise).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (referring to and
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citizen rationally to fear that, if another citizen is detained without any
constitutional protections, the same may happen to him. Consequently,
those detainments may stunt the political process.
CONCLUSION
Courts should trust the people of the nation,168 even when the people
make choices contrary to the jurists' own best judgment. 69 It may take
more time, but citizens involved in the democratic process will eventually
arrive at the "right" decision. 7 Even if a court could be absolutely certain
that its decision would be "right,"'' the mere possibility that the people
will lose an opportunity to wrestle with their own consciences and to work
through complex moral and political issues within and with their
community (in essence, to participate in the democratic process) offends
the Spirit of the Nation.172
Justice White provided a piercing observation when he wrote that
"[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution."'' 73 Indeed, this seems
summarizing a June 9, 2002 Order signed by President Bush authorizing the Department of
Justice to detain Jose Padilla as an "enemy combatant."). This order is available at
http://news.findlaw.corlcnnldocs/padilla/padillabush60902det.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). See also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003)
(concluding that the President may not constitutionally detain an American citizen seized within
the country as an enemy combatant), rev'd on other grounds, 124 S.Ct. 2711 (2004).
168. See THAYER, supra note 78, at 108 (noting that the legislature, as representative of the
people, "is entitled to the most entire and real respect").
169. This rationale is not that dissimilar from that of the Apostle Paul. See Philemon 1:8,
(New International) ("Therefore, although in Christ I could be bold and order you to do what you
ought to do, yet I appeal to you on the basis of love."). Paul refrained from exercising a power to
order a just result, trusting that Philemon would fall back on the proper principles and do the right
thing. Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court should not be afraid to trust the people to fall back on
democratic and community centered principles in reaching the correct decision. Although both
the Apostle Paul and the Supreme Court Justices reserve the right to order the "right" result, they
both should have faith in the people that they will reach the "right" result. To do otherwise would
rob both Philemon and the American people of the opportunity and the duty to do the mental and
moral calculations that make the individual and the community (whether the church or the nation)
that much stronger. See also Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Address at the University of Capetown,
in RFK: COLLECTED SPEECHES 240 (Edwin 0. Guthman & C. Richard Allen eds., 1993) ("We
must recognize the full human equality of all of our people-before God, before the law, and in
the councils of government .... We must do it for the single and fundamental reason that it is
the right thing to do.").
170. Other governmental systems operate at a much faster pace. However, such systems
often sacrifice deliberation and liberty for the possibility of efficiency and swift change.
171. See sources cited in note 16 and accompanying text.
172. See THAYER, supra note 78, at 107 ("The tendency of a common and easy resort to
[judicial review], now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people,
and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility. It is no light thing to do that.").
173. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
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an echo of the very case in which the power of judicial review was first
established." 4 Thus, the Court must not venture beyond the Constitution to
preserve not only its own legitimacy, but the strength of the entire
democracy. However, the Court has summarily disposed of the very
opinion in which Justice White reiterated this most foundational
principle.'75
The purpose of this Comment is not to suggest that the judiciary has
no role in the constitutional order. The project has simply been to
contribute to the discussion of the nature of the "countermajoritarian
difficulty." Although exercise of judicial review presents "difficulties," the
exercise of these countermajoritarian powers of the court are sometimes
necessary. While it is the judiciary's duty to "say what the law is," judges
should nevertheless remain aware of the consequences of the exercise of
judicial review, especially when the exercise of judicial review is not
"clearly rooted in the language and design of the Constitution." When the
courts are sensitive to these issues, the people will have an opportunity to
produce real and lasting social change.
With all this in mind, therefore, let us disprove of an unnecessary
schedule of injections of judicial novocaine that would numb the
conscience of the lively American nation and render it slow and
unresponsive. Rather, let the remedies of the freedoms of speech, of the
press, and of association course though the veins of the body of the Nation
and make it strong and youthful henceforth. 76
LITTLE V. WEST
110, 122 (1989) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
174. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 ("Could it be the intention of those
who gave this power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a
case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under
which it arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained.").
175. See Lawrence v. Texas, 534 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v.
Hardwick should be and now is overruled."). It is interesting to consider that such an overruling
in fact undermines Marbury. It would be most troubling for the Court to use the power
established in Marbury to undermine the rationale to justify the use of the power in the first
instance.
176. Cox, supra note 43, at 6 ("The Federal Constitution guarantees extraordinarily wide
opportunities to use mass meetings, parades, and similar public demonstrations to express
sentiment .... The Freedom March held in Washington in the summer of 1963 is a dramatic
example.").
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